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The international development institutions and regionalism:  
The case of Southeast Asia 
 
 
Dr Susan Engel 
Senior Lecturer 
University of Wollongong 





Why is it that the World Bank has failed to effectively incorporate the impact of regionalisation 
within its economic development strategies and policy advice for borrowing countries? This is an 
interesting puzzle given the increasing importance that scholarly observers, policy practitioners and 
development agencies have attached to regionalism and regionalisation in recent years. In the fiscal 
years 1995-2005, the World Bank provided only $1.7 billion in support for regional (or multi-
country) operations across the globe, this is less than one per cent of its project and other funding 
overall. In Southeast Asia, while the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has had a particularly strong 
engagement with regionalism, the World Bank has only recently started to come on board with 
regional analysis and programs. The paper proposes that the gap is due to a combination of 
institutional and ideological factors and explores this proposition through a study of the World Bank 





Regionalisation and regional integration have been the subject of debate in political science and 
political economy regarding its impact on development for some time but only recently have they 
gained sustained attention in mainstream economic analysis and development theory, this literature 
emphasises things like trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and regional production networks. 
Equally, in donor circles a number of agencies are quite engaged with these issues – indeed, there is 
growing acknowledgement that many problems in the areas of transport, disease, pollution, forestry, 
agriculture and the environment need to be tackled through regional and global forums. Yet, the 
globe’s largest development organisation, the World Bank, has only very recently started to engage 
with the topic and only in a quite limited form. This is an interesting puzzle around an organisation 
that has over the past two decades – if not longer - prided itself in being in the forefront of the 
development debate.  
 
The focus here is on both regionalisation and regionalism, where regionalism refers to formal 
institutional processes and regionalisation to the economic, social and political relations between 
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nations and their impact on the development project in each country (Breslin and Higgott 2000; 
Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez 2004: 2; Kim 2004). There is clearly much grey between what constitutes 
regionalism and regionalisation, nevertheless, it is a useful distinction. In looking at regionalism and 
regionalisation, no precise role for regions or regionalism in development is advocated, however, 
the proposition is that regional interactions do constitute an important factor in the political 
economy of any country’s development and that they are ignored with peril. This reflects a broad 
critical political economy approach that questions the way traditional development projects and 
international financial institutions have institutionalised nation-states as the site of ‘development.’ 
In this process, somewhat artificial barriers have been drawn between peoples and spaces which 
have framed and constrained both the development project and people’s lives. Most academic 
literature focuses in fact on regionalism rather than regionalisation, that is to say regional 
cooperation initiatives across the globe have produced a large and continually growing academic 
literature, more from political scientists and political economists than from economists (on 
Southeast Asia see inter alia Beeson 2002; Tran Van Hoa 2003; Beeson 2004; Harvie, Kimura et al. 
2005; Scollay 2005; Jones and Smith 2006; Dent 2008; Frost 2008). However, since the 1990s, 
regionalisation too has been the subject of a growing political economy literature prompted partly 
by the view that regionalisation and globalisation were operating in ‘sometimes mutually 
reinforcing and at other times contradictory’ ways (Kim 2004: 43). 
 
This paper starts by exploring the World Bank’s policy and practice in relation to regionalisation 
and regional integration globally and in Southeast Asia and drawing out the underlying 
commitments that shape the policies and practices. What it finds is a notable silence on the topic, 
which is the product of a combination of institutional and ideological commitments. Institutionally, 
the Bank is the product of a state-centred discourse and it reproduces this discourse through its 
organisation and management, which structured around lending to individual nation-states. 
Ideologically, the domination of the post-Washington Consensus (PWC) in the Bank reinforces the 
Bank’s state-centric model of development – it promotes neoliberal states, structured in ways that 
serve Western-dominated, liberal capitalism. Further, the New Institutional Economic (NIE) 
analysis underpinning the PWC methodologically and philosophically largely ignores regional 
political economy.  
 
NIE has been a major influence on the Bank’s approach to development since the late 1990s (North 
1998; Fine 2001; Broad 2006). Indeed, it is the source of large part of the so-called post-
Washington Consensus (PWC) – which is how critical political economists have labelled the 
Bank’s new development policy approach. The ‘post’ in this case, is an indicator of the degree of 
 3 
continuity with the neoliberal Washington Consensus marked, in particular, by the continuation of a 
conservative/neoliberal approach to monetary and fiscal policy. The PWC does suggest that the 
Bank will pay greater attention to the specific situation of each borrower and this should manifest 
itself in better developed socio-economic analysis of local conditions as well as consideration of 
global and regional political economy. In terms of the Bank’s analytical output, it has published a 
look of work in areas connected to the PWC, for example on the topics of the social costs of 
adjustment and poverty, decentralisation as a policy prescription for increasing participation, 
ensuring local needs are met and improving governance and the role of social capital in 
development. However, its lending practices have not matched the changes in its analytical output 
(Engel forthcoming 2009).With regards to regionalism and regionalisation neither the Bank’s 
research output nor it lending program have kept pace with the broader interest in this topic.  
 
The World Bank and Regionalism 
 
The World Bank has been a leader in the study and implementation of trends in development over 
the past two decades; it has promoted ideas such as social capital, local community participation, 
country ownership and pro-poor growth and related initiatives include Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers and the Knowledge Bank, however, it has only had limited involvement in research and 
projects on regionalism and regionalisation. Prior to the mid-1990s, it was involved in a couple of 
regional projects and in 1996, it initiated a research project on Regionalism and Development, 
whose research outputs seems to have focused mostly on regional trade (Schiff and Winters 2003; 
World Bank 2005). Interestingly, the research outputs did not generated a high level of publicity at 
a time when the Bank’s publicity machine was in overdrive with the Bank under the presidency of 
James D. Wolfensohn. The Bank did start funding a number of regional (or multi-country) 
operations around this time. The review of these projects for the fiscal years 1995-2005 from the 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group, called The Development Potential of Regional Programs 
(2007: xvi), noted that the Bank provided $1.7 billion in support for regional operations in this time 
- this was less than one per cent of its project and other funding overall for the period. Two thirds of 
the expenditure was in the second half of the decade. Half of the funds went to Africa and around 
half of the projects ‘focused on the environment and have been funded with grants from the Global 
Environment Facility’ (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xvi).  
 
The review came to a number of insightful conclusions regarding the Bank’s limited engagement 
with regional projects and the nature and operations of the projects that did exist. It explained the 
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lack of projects as the product of the Bank’s structuring around country management units. The 
majority of Bank staff are located within the six regional units, but the regional units are largely an 
organisational mechanism – staff sit within country management units and it is these that organise 
and manage lending and operations. Country-based budgeting has dominated the bank since its 
inception and this acts as a major disincentive to developing regional operations (World Bank 
Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xviii ). Since 1997, there has been a major decentralisation of 
Bank lending staff from Washington to country offices and this has only served to reinforce the 
country focus. While this may be benefit country expertise, it has increased impediments to regional 
operations. Other disincentives identified by the review include that way that Bank grant funding is 
committed; a lack of involvement from country staff in regional programs; and that Bank 
procedures - especially in relation to risk management, monitoring and evaluation, contractual 
arrangements and financing of preparation costs for projects - are all centred around country 
operations and are difficult to utilise for regional programs (World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2007: 45-9): 45. 
 
These kinds of institutional impediments may also be a factor in the problems the review identified 
in the identification of regional projects and their integration with the Bank’s key country planning 
documents –Country Assistance Strategies (CASs). The evaluation found that overall individual 
initiatives have been: 
relevant… But they do not derive from joint assessments with those countries of 
which issues would most benefit from regional approaches, nor are they closely 
linked to the Bank’s country programs. Only a third of the 19 regional programs 
reviewed were included among the strategic objectives of the Bank Country 
Assistance Strategies of all participating countries (World Bank Independent 
Evaluation Group 2007: xvi). 
On the lack of integration with CASs, the report later notes that: 
…there is a disconnect with Bank Country Assistance Strategies (CASs). The 
CASs do not reflect the regional strategic frameworks. Nor do they indicate how 
individual regional programs feature in country priorities. Only one-quarter of all 
(262) CASs for countries involved in regional projects (under way in fiscal 1995-
2005) indicate that a regional approach is appropriate to the country’s 
development agenda or mention the regional program in which the country is 
involved (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 12-3). 
 
The report recommended that ‘that the Bank adopt a bigger role in support of regional programs…’ 
by incorporating regional strategies into CASs and developing administrative structure for 
supporting regional programs (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xviii). The Bank 
Management’s response to the report was very circumspect, highlighting methodological flaws and 
noting the need for a ‘measured approach’ to regional operations (World Bank Independent 
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Evaluation Group 2007: xxii). This modest response and indeed the Bank’s overall minimal 
involvement in regional initiatives is quite surprising given that the Bank has tended to position 
itself in the lead of new development directions and responses – a recent example being the Bank’s 
push to have new global climate funds under its auspices. Further, the Bank has faced some 
competition from the regional development banks as all of them have ‘recently issued strategies for 
fostering programs at the regional level, although they have not, with a few exceptions, provided 
substantial financial support for multicountry programs’ (World Bank Independent Evaluation 
Group 2007: 44). 
 
In the Bank’s East Asia and the Pacific region, it ‘has remarkably fewer regional programs’ than 
other Bank regions — it has only six (five partnerships and one project), and the South Asia region 
does not have any projects (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: xxix, 6 and 11). Only 
one of the East Asia and Pacific initiatives is in Southeast Asia – the Mekong River systems 
commission. In contrast, the Asian Development Bank has been quite active in regionalisation in 
Southeast Asia, of particular note is its Greater Mekong Subregion initiative, which started in 1992 
and aims to increase economic cooperation with a particular focus on infrastructure linkages. From 
1992 to 2008 it involved US$1.9 billion of loans from the ADB and co-financing of $2.7 billion 
from other donors plus around $2.2 billion in funding from participating states (Asian Development 
Bank 2008). 
 
The Bank’s institutional structures based on state-based development operations do go a long way 
to explaining the lack of enthusiasm and engagement with regional initiatives, however, the 
proposition here is that the reasons go deeper than outlined in the Bank’s evaluation. They are also a 
product of the Bank’s approach to development and the theorising underpinning that, which the 
paper now examines before undertaking a case study of the Bank’s approach to regionalisation in 
Vietnam in order to further highlight the reasons and consequences this approach. 
 
The World Bank’s understanding of regionalism and regionalisation derives largely from its 
mainstream economic analysis. The case for regionalism has been made from both neoclassical 
positions and its variant NIE, although overall neoclassical economics has not paid much attention 
to regionalisation because its unit of analysis is generally either firms, individual nation-states or the 
globe as a whole. Through this focus, neoclassical economics privileges and naturalises domestic 
markets and nation-states, and these interact - seemingly with no impact from geography or level of 
development - with the rest of the world. This framework was transferred to development 
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economics when it started in the 1950s. As Berger (2004: 61-2) so nicely put it, development 
economics in general has: 
…conflated capitalist development with national development and turned nation-states that 
flowed from complex and contested histories into unproblematic units to be developed and 
modernized, equating the governments of those nations with the nations themselves. This 
is directly linked to the way in which development economics and the idea of national 
development rested on an elitist and technocratic approach that conceived of development 
as a technical problem outside of history and politics. 
This lack of acknowledgement of geographic location also serves to hide neoclassicism’s 
commitment to the existing structures of power and privilege that permeate the globe spatially and 
otherwise (this is a theme in various ways in Arrighi 1994; Brenner 2002; Harvey 2003). Explicit 
regionally-based political economic analysis could reveal structures of power and privilege and - as 
an organisation of these existing structures - it is not in the Bank’s interests to reveal these. 
Neoliberalism, which was dominant in the Bank from the early 1980s on, is even more suspicious 
of regionalism than neoclassicism for a range of reasons, key ones being its general hostility to both 
state and supranational organisation and that regionalism could potentially divert attention from the 
all important project of multilateral liberalisation. However, there has been a neoliberal case made 
for regionalism on the basis that it can be ‘used as a device for overcoming entrenched resistance to 
multilateral liberalization and for building coalitions favoring liberalization over wider areas’ 
(Frankel and Eichengreen, 1995 in Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez 2004: 23). 
 
Two recent Bank reports - The Development Potential of Regional Programs (2007) and the World 
Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography (WDR 2009) make the case for Bank 
involvement in regional initiatives largely in NIE terms. NIE offers an expanded view of what 
constitutes market failures - problems of externalities, increasing returns to scale, monopolies, 
information failures and transaction costs. It also allows more space for regionalism, in particular, it 
gives a role to ‘the development of regional public goods’ to ‘compensate for the failures of 
markets’ (Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez 2004: 23). It has been from NIE that much of the growing 
economics literature on regionalism has derived. The 2007 report focused on ‘regional 
externalities,’ it suggested that negative regional externalities can be addressed in cost-effective 
ways through regional structures. It also noted the possibilities to achieve economies of scale in the 
production of goods and services on a regional basis (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 
2007: 5). The analysis of why regional cooperation to address negative externalities does not occur 
relied on standard neoclassical economic arguments: the opportunity costs of regional programs, the 
free-rider problem (here it uses relative gains as the deciding factor rather than absolute gains) and 
the issue of coordination (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 5). The report’s 
assessment of the relevance of regional programs came down to a need for a calculation of 
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existence of externalities and efficiencies and the ‘alignment between country and regional 
priorities…’ (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2007: 6). 
 
The WDR 2009 argued for concurrent regional and global integration in order that developing 
countries can gain from economies of scale, labour and capital mobility and reductions in transport 
costs (World Bank 2008: 260). It viewed ‘regional integration as a mechanism to increase local 
supply capacity…’ and proposed differing strategies for developing countries dependent upon their 
proximity to large markets (World Bank 2008: 260-1). In other words, the focus is on economic 
regionalisation rather than on regionalism. Like most WDRs, it expressed some of the most 
progressive ideas around the Bank, in this case suggesting that countries far from world markets 
(Central Asia, Pacific Island states and sub-Saharan Africa) should aim for a model of integration 
that allows for cross-country compensation for those countries that suffer short-term losses from 
regional integration. It also championed support from the international community for developing 
social services and human capital in these remote locations (World Bank 2008: 261). 
 
On the one hand, the report – given its NIE influences - allowed for greater gains from regional 
cooperation and integration than in standard neoclassical analysis, on the other hand, neoclassical 
hostility to the state is not absent. So, for example, the report warns that when regional integration 
‘is institution driven, as in most developing neighborhoods today, political economy challenges can 
become major concerns’ (World Bank 2008: 262). Presumably ‘political economy challenges’ is a 
rather opaque reference to the problems of government failure and corruption for which the 
standard Bank prescription during the Washington Consensus decades was reducing the role of the 
state. Under the PWC, the goal remains a minimalist state but political economy challenges justify a 
range of new Bank interventions in recipient countries that aim to shape them as neoliberal states 
supporting Western and US capitalism (Crawford 2006; Engel forthcoming 2009; Porter and Craig 
2004; Weber 2006). This framework also goes some way to explaining the preference for 
regionalisation over regionalism in the report, as the former is largely the realm of the private sector 
and this justifies too the Bank’s lack of action and programs around the issue. 
 
What we see in these two reports then is a very narrow NIE analysis of regionalism and 
regionalisation that does little to broaden the Bank’s approach to development. This combined with 
institutional factors are inhibiting a genuine engagement by the Bank with regionalism. Having said 
that , the Bank is not a monolith. It is a very large bureaucracy – with over 11,000 staff (Berkman 
2008: 16) and it does operate is somewhat different ways in different locations. Studying Bank 
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operations in different locations enhances understanding of the connection between the Bank’s 
‘theory’ and the ‘practice’ of its operations. 
 
Vietnam and Asian Integration 
 
Vietnam is an interesting case study because in its transition to a more market-based economy it has 
achieved high rates of growth and high levels of poverty reduction. It has done this with high levels 
of donor support through much of the process, indeed, it is probably not stretching the point to say 
that Vietnam has been a ‘donor darling.’ More to the point though, donors have influenced 
Vietnam’s development project. It is an interesting case study too, because these changes have 
taken place as part of a dynamic and increasingly interconnected region. Vietnam’s transition really 
got under way in 1986, through a process of socio-economic reform or renovation was called Doi 
Moi; since its outset economic growth has averaged over seven per cent per annum. This section 
starts by briefly examining Doi Moi then looks at Vietnam’s links with the region before examining 
the World Bank’s relationship with Vietnam and its approach to regionalism. 
 
Vietnam was never as centrally planned or controlled as other socialist countries (Tønnesson 2000: 
243), nevertheless its economic performance pre-1986 was, for a range of reasons, quite poor (Van 
Arkadie and Mallon 2003: 51-67). Dzung The Nguyen described Doi Moi as comprising three main 
periods (Nguyen 2001: 166-170). The first period, ‘Path Seeking’ (1986-1988), was driven by the 
informal activity occurring across the economy. It involved a series of microeconomic reforms that 
reduced the limits on private sector activity and domestic trade, followed by increases in official 
prices for non-essential consumer goods to bring them closer to market prices. Further, in 1988 land 
was re-allocated in an equitable manner to households, which was central to significant 
improvements in farm productivity (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003: 70). These improvements were 
at the core of the dramatic reductions in poverty that took place over the next two decades (Masina 
2006: 3,17). 
 
Macroeconomic reform started in 1987 with the first currency devaluation, although the major 
devaluation was in 1989 and this brought the Dong close to its market rate and produced positive 
interest rates (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003: 70). The second phase of reform, 1989 to 1993, was 
the key transition phase - reforms systematically moved Vietnam towards a market-type economy 
and macroeconomic stabilisation took place (Nguyen 2001: 167). By 1993, growth was close to ten 
per cent and it remained at high levels until mid-decade (Joint Donor Report to the Vietnam 
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Consultative Group Meeting 2003: 9). Dzung The Nguyen’s third period of Doi Moi is 1994 to 
2001 and the focus was on consolidating reforms - tight fiscal and monetary policy was maintained 
and incremental reforms continued including decentralisation of budget management, public sector 
management reform and ongoing integration with the global economy (Nguyen 2001: 168). Since 
2001, the Government has largely continued the commitment to incremental reform and economic 
growth has remained at seven to eight percent per annum. Poverty declined from 37.4 per cent of 
the population in 1998, to 28.9 per cent in 2002 (Joint Donor Report to the Vietnam Consultative 
Group Meeting 2003: 12-13) and 18 per cent in 2007. 
 
Vietnam’s economic growth and poverty reduction over these past two decades needs to be not just 
situated in the context of a fairly dynamic region but understood as part of the region. The links to 
the region operate in the areas of geography, climate, regional migration, trade, production chains, 
FDI and formal governmental links and relations - exemplified by Vietnam’s joining ASEAN in 
1995. In terms of Vietnam’s closest neighbours, Cambodia has been growing at a high rate and, 
while Lao PDR has not performed as well, the Mekong tourist route connecting the three countries 
has provided all three countries with a significant revenue stream and has produced close inter-
governmental relations between tourism ministries. The ADB has poured a lot of effort into a 
Greater Mekong Subregion project, which has had a particular focus on transport corridors. Its 
North-South Economic Corridor component is linking Bangkok, China’s Yunnan province and 
Haiphong in Vietnam is seen as having a good deal of commercial potential (Frost 2008: 71). 
Equally though, Vietnam’s land borders are associated with a range of problems that require 
regional policy responses, for example people trafficking, upstream deforestation along the Mekong 
and its tributaries producing increasing flooding in the Delta and cross-border pollution, particularly 
in the north around the Chinese border. 
 
China’s rapid growth has been a particularly strong influence on Vietnam, which is visible in the 
growth in trade between the two nations. Vietnamese exports to China have grown from just US 
$361 million in 1995 to $3,242 million in 2006, which made it the fourth largest destination for 
exports; in addition it was Vietnam’s major source of imports (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
2008). Indeed, as Table 1 indicates, the region is the location of the majority of Vietnam’s trade. 
 
Table 1: Vietnam’s Merchandise Trade 1995-2006 by Top Ten Countries 
Top Ten Sources of Imports  Top Ten Export Destinations 
No Country 
Value 
USD mil  No Country 
Value 
USD mil 
1 Singapore 34,384.72  1 Japan 31,536.60 
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2 Japan 29,084.89  2 United States 28,616.70 
3 Taiwan 28,749.99  3 China 18,087.90 
4 China 28,441.94  4 Australia 15,052.45 
5 Korea, Rep. 26,913.47  5 Singapore 13,942.43 
6 Thailand 13,852.51  6 Taiwan 9,070.20 
7 Hong Kong, SAR (China) 9,556.81  7 Germany 8,695.49 
8 Malaysia 7,586.93  8 United Kingdom 6,745.08 
9 United States 6,634.91  9 Korea, Rep. 5,593.68 
10 Germany 5,508.46  10 Malaysia 5,160.92 
 Total Imports 244,609.90   Total Exports 207,917.10 
Source: (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2008) 
 
Most mainstream commentators consider trade and FDI have made fairly substantial contributions 
to Vietnam’s overall economic performance and both these areas indicate Vietnam’s substantial 
integration into the Asian region. Table 2 shows that six of Vietnam’s top ten sources of FDI are 
from the region and overall the region provides 67 per cent of FDI (Nguyen and Nguyen 2007: 11). 
These patterns of growing linkages in trade and FDI between East and Southeast Asia are occurring 
across most of Southeast Asia and have ‘helped spur various regionalisation processes” (Dent 2008: 
87). 
 
Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment by Country of Origin, 1988-2006 







1 Taiwan 1550 23 8112.35 13 3576.90 13 
2 Singapore 452 7 8076.01 13 2982.22 11 
3 Korea 1263 19 7799.43 13 3228.95 12 
4 Japan 735 11 7398.91 12 3277.00 12 
5 Hong Kong 375 6 5279.52 9 1952.51 7 
6 British Virgin Islands 275 4 3225.64 5 1133.75 4 
7 Netherlands 74 1 2365.34 4 1373.47 5 
8 France 178 3 2197.72 4 1339.94 5 
9 US 306 4 2111.46 3 1151.24 4 
10 Malaysia 200 3 1647.85 3 763.17 3 
 Total 5408 79 4214.24 80 20779.13 78 
 All Countries 6813  60743.69  26505.82  
Source: (Nguyen and Nguyen 2007: 11) 
 
The World Bank and Vietnam 
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The World Bank has been the second largest provider of official development assistance (ODA) to 
Vietnam in most years since it re-engaged with Vietnam in 1993. Although Japan is usually the 
largest provider of ODA, the World Bank has a larger and more visible presence. This is because of 
the Bank’s central role in donor coordination role, which increased after 1999 when Vietnam agreed 
to join the pilot Comprehensive Development Framework process and the associated Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper process. The Bank also chairs the Consultative Group for Vietnam 
(CGV). The Bank’s role in the CGV gives it influence broadly over the geographical spread and 
sectors of donor’s ODA. In addition to its lending program, the Bank has managed a number of 
trust funds for Vietnam and has encouraged joint funding of its loans, for example, under the 2004 
structural adjustment loan, called Poverty Reduction Support Credit III, the Bank lent $100 million 
and co-financing by other donors was $73 million (World Bank 2004).  
 
A 2001 study by Irene Nørlund confirmed that the Bank plays a lead role in pushing a 
‘development’ agenda in Vietnam. However, the response from the GoV and others to the role of 
the Bank has generally been positive as it is seen as having a ‘…very open attitude in Vietnam’ 
(Nørlund 2001: 9). Further, the Bank has generally adopted a ‘…tolerant and longer-term view of 
the relationship’ with Vietnam (Painter 2005: 273). Despite this relatively open attitude, the Bank 
presents Doi Moi essentially in neoliberal terms. Yet there are a number of reasons to be cautious 
about this interpretation and to examine the impact of indigenous influences on Doi Moi in some 
detail. For one thing, as Stefan de Vylder pointed out, in Vietnam microeconomic reforms preceded 
macroeconomic reform — the reverse of the standard International Monetary Fund (IMF) approach 
(de Vylder 1995: 37-8). Further, despite reductions in the SOE sector and tight monetary and fiscal 
policy, government expenditure actually increased during the reform period, again in stark contrast 
to standard IMF prescriptions of reducing government expenditures (Nguyen 2001: 174). Doi Moi 
was more than mere ‘adjustment’ of the economy, it ‘…revolutionised the entire set of development 
concepts and strategies’ (Nørlund, Ca et al. 2003: 78).  
 
The largest area of contention between the World Bank and Vietnam has been the pace and 
sequencing of reform – and despite pressure from the Bank, it is notable that Vietnam has been 
relatively successful in doing reform at its own pace. Overall, the Bank presents and analyses 
Vietnam’s experience as a state-based neoliberal development project and it attempts to deny the 
influence of socialism and the model of the East Asian ‘developmental states’ on Vietnam’s 
development path (Masina 2006: 28). Bank economist’s analyses of Vietnam emphasises openness 
in terms of trade and FDI as key to Vietnam’s development (Dollar 1996; Dollar and Kray 2004) 
but do not regard who they trade with or where investment is from as important. This means that the 
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Bank essentially does not acknowledge the role of regionalisation or regionalism in Vietnam’s 
development trajectory. This lack of acknowledgement is also found in the Bank’s CASs for 
Vietnam for the years 2002 and 2007. 
 
The macroeconomic analysis in the CASs in both 2002 and 2007 includes virtually no analysis of 
the country’s performance in the regional or global context despite the focus in the era of the PWC 
on country specificity. In the 2002 CAS, the Bank explained the decline in level of FDI to Vietnam 
both directly before and after Asian Financial Crisis as the product of domestic problems, in 
particular too slow a pace in (neoliberal) economic reform. This is important because, as Masina 
has demonstrated, in reality the only area that saw decline in FDI commitments was real estate (due 
to the bursting of the regional property bubble) and - outside this and oil and gas (which tends to 
yearly fluctuations) - FDI commitments were actually relatively stable (Masina 2006: 75-6). 
Further, the decline that did occur could be largely attributed ‘to a parallel decrease in outward 
investment from those countries which had represented the dominant source of FDI to Vietnam’, 
that is, from East Asia, where 60 percent of Vietnamese FDI at the time was derived (Masina 2006: 
79). In other words, a regional political economy analysis sheds quite a new light on FDI changes. 
 
The 2007 CAS also contains virtually no analysis of regional or global developments and their 
possible impacts on Vietnam. It continues the neoliberal reification of liberalisation arguing that: 
[b]oth global integration and domestic reforms are needed to sustain rapid 
economic growth… Further integration with the world economy, especially 
through Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), is bound 
to lock in some of the required changes and level the playing field between 
domestic and foreign enterprises (World Bank 2007: 8). 
The view of the WTO as a site for Vietnam’s development is obviously quite problematic given the 
failure to complete the Doha round on trade liberalisation. In fact, this failure may be a blessing for 
developing nations as some analysis suggest that their losses from non-market agricultural access 
conditions would have been higher than likely projections of gains (Wise and Gallagher 2006). 
Moreover, evidence suggests that small countries have not, in general, been very successful in 
pursuing their interests though the WTO given their limited resources and instead there has been a 
turn to bilateral and regional agreements, which has been particularly prevalent in Asia. Equally, it 
is the case that current international trading system is not as friendly to Southeast and East Asia as it 
had been during the Cold War era – a point agreed by both mainstream and critical analysts. 
Therefore, it is certainly worth pondering why the World Bank considered WTO accession was 
such key to Vietnam’s development project and there was no consideration of the potential benefits 
or dangers of regional agreements to Vietnam. It indicates that the Bank remains committed at a 
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number of levels to a fairly unreconstructed version of neoliberalism and the Washington 
Consensus. 
 
The extent to which mainstream neoliberal agenda has remained at the fore in the Bank is also 
visible in the CAS analysis of natural resources and environmental management, which begins by 
espousing land-titling and markets as the solution to environmental and developmental concerns 
(World Bank 2007: 10). Despite a number of Vietnam’s environmental problems having regional 
dimensions, there is no mention of them in the CAS in relation to either the environment or in the 
mitigation of natural disasters. The CAS does not refer to the Bank’s one regional program that 
includes Vietnam – the Mekong River Commission project. The section on transport and 
infrastructure contains nothing on regional integration, nor does any of the Bank’s investment loans 
in these sectors in the period 2000-2004, despite the fact that Vietnam has been deeply involved in 
the ADB sponsored Greater Mekong subregion program. This has a strong emphasis on regional 
transport corridors that Vietnam has been actively involved in and, more to the point, these regional 
transport corridors do appear to have a notable potential to boost Vietnamese development (Frost 
2008: 71). These gaps are important because, as Pietro Masina (2006: 88) pointed out:  
An analysis of comparative advantages in East Asia and the reorganization of 
regional productive systems in a post-crisis environment would be very beneficial 
in helping Vietnam in planning medium- and long-term development strategies. 
But the ‘common wisdom’ based on neo-classical economics tends to confute the 
need for such planning, supporting the view that reforms would per se increase 
Vietnam’s competitiveness. Thus, the international financial institutions, which 
would have the means for a large-scale investigation, remain silent in providing 
elements useful in understanding the dynamics characterizing economic 




This paper has demonstrated that the World Bank’s lack of engagement with regionalisation and 
regionalism is derived from both institutional constraints and ideological commitments. These are 
not, of course, unrelated, indeed they both can be traced back to the Bank’s origins – its formation 
was the upshot of newly hegemonic America and its interest in organising the world system in a 
way that suited its interests. And its interests were a system of nation-states open to penetration by 
Western capital and goods. So the Bank was from the outset structured to lend to supposedly 
sovereign states for projects. However, over the years it has bent many of its institutional strictures, 
for example its Articles of Agreement prioritise lending for specific projects but, since the mid-
1980s, program lending or structural adjustment lending has accounted for at least 30 per cent of 
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Bank commitments on average. But, it is unwilling to bends its rules in order to promote regional 
development projects. The Bank’s reticence to engage with either regionalism or regionalisation 
needs then to also be framed by its current development ideology, the post-Washington Consensus. 
Regional development and cooperation could be a danger to the PWC's core ideas and 
commitments because it suggests a need for a more genuine engagement with the role of the state 
and inter-state structures in promoting development and, at the end of the day, the PWC still 
promotes minimalist states, just ones better able to support liberal capitalist relations than the 
Washington Consensus state showed itself capable of. 
 
The very limited engagement with regionalism and regionalisation was demonstrated too through 
the case study of Vietnam. In Vietnam’s case, the lack of a regional political economy analysis 
prevents the Bank from developing a fuller understanding of Vietnam’s development trajectory and 
from implementing regionally-based responses to development issues in areas such as transport, 
disease, pollution, forestry, agriculture and the environment which need to be tackled through 
regional and global forums. Given the often poor outcomes of development assistance and their 
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